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Topics related to evolution tend to generate a disproportionate amount of misunderstanding in traditional
textbooks, other educational materials, and the media. This is not necessarily the fault of textbook and popular
writers: many of these concepts are confusingly discussed in the scientific literature. However, faults can be
corrected, and doing so makes it easier to explain related concepts. Three general areas are treated here: ideas and
language about evolution, historical and philosophical aspects of evolution, and natural selection and related
concepts. The aim of this paper is to produce a template for a more logical, historically and scientifically correct
treatment of evolutionary terms and concepts.
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job is to present science to students and other members
of the public who, increasingly, come from disparate cul-
tural and economic backgrounds, live in states that have
conflicting guidelines for what should be presented in
science texts, and are being subjected to deteriorating
state support and increasing political factionalism. With
less money to spend on instructional materials, competi-
tion is tougher than ever.
It is nearly impossible for a scientist to keep up with
the literature in evolutionary biology, or virtually any
other scientific field. There are more journals, more on-
line sources, more columns, stories, blogs, postings, and
videos than ever before. How can professional writers
(most of whom do not have advanced or even basic de-
grees in science), let alone biologists, keep up with this
explosion of literature and judge its relevance?
The answer is, they cannot, and in practice, they do
not. Teachers who compare closely the treatments of
subjects in competing textbooks will notice that they
promise the moon, advertising the individual and unique
effectiveness of their pedagogical approach. Be that as it
may, the science content is peculiarly uniform among
publishing houses, although specific examples and de-
tails of concepts ‘may vary’ (to quote traditional textbook
jargon). And sometimes that content is wrong, and itCorrespondence: kpadian@berkeley.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is phas been for many years. Writers are in a difficult pos-
ition because, if new research seems to contradict trad-
itional information, it is hard for them to tell whether
this new finding is really legitimate or will be overturned
in a matter of months. And they have been burned in
the past (just look up ‘Protoavis’). But textbook writers
are also reluctant to change their presentations, even
when they are long outdated, because they worry about
being ‘too different’ from other textbook programs and
confusing some teachers who expect certain content and
cannot always keep up with new developments in the
field. An example is how long it is taking textbooks to
get rid of the Linnean classification system and teach
phylogenetic systematics (cladistics).
Because the treatment of scientific subjects is so uni-
form among textbooks, specific errors and misrepresen-
tations are common to most publishing houses. These
have been picked up by other media, and many of them
are of longstanding. In the following suggestions I try to
point out why certain conventions in science texts and
popular publications are either incorrect or technically
correct but could be presented better, and to suggest
alternative treatments. I hope it will become clear that
much of the engendered confusion is due to us scien-
tists, who have not been as precise with their diction as
we should be. Even though we often agree among each
other that we know what we mean, this does not help
textbook writers, reporters, teachers, or students.en Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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cessarily incomplete; I have tried to divide them gener-
ally into ‘The ideas and language of evolution’, ‘Historical
and philosophical aspects of evolution’, and ‘Natural se-
lection and related concepts’. For related articles see
Padian (1997, 1999, 2007, 2008a, b, c, 2009), and many
issues of William J. Bennetta’s The Textbook Letter (see
http://www.textbookleague.org/missn.htm). The goal of
this paper is to stimulate awareness and discussion among
scientists, educators, textbook writers, and journalists
who have to interpret evolution to students and the gen-
eral public. Although there is a lot of room for in-
terpretation and debate of language and concepts, the
hope is that a forthright discussion of ambiguities and
infelicities should eventually improve the presentation
of evolution to the public.The ideas and language of evolution
Distinguish evolution as fact, pattern, and process
The word ‘evolution’ has several meanings. So do lots of
useful words. Let us take ‘business’. What’s my business?
I’m an architect. Where’s my business? On Fourth Street.
How much do I make? None of your business. Three
different senses of the same word. And so it is with evo-
lution. Evolution is a fact: science understands that life
has evolved through time, and there is no reasonable
doubt about this anywhere in the scientific community.
It is a theory: it comprises a great many patterns, pro-
cesses, observations, and hypotheses - all testable. Evo-
lution has patterns, such as the patterns of diversity
through time. It has processes, such as natural selection,
sexual selection, species selection, drift, and more. Evo-
lution is a big subject with a lot of dimensions. As long
as you are clear about which dimension of evolution you
mean, there’s no conflict for readers.Figure 1 Before Darwin (1859), similarities and differences in
morphology, the ‘queen of the sciences’ in the early
Enlightenment years, were explained in pre-evolutionary terms.
Geoffroy St.-Hilaire stressed the ‘Unity of Type’ found in similar
animals such as mollusks and vertebrates; Cuvier stressed the
‘Conditions of Existence’ by which otherwise similar animals differed
by virtue of ecological specializations. Darwin’s simple definition of
evolution as ‘descent with modification’ proposed that most
similarities can be traced to common descent, whereas most
differences in broadly similar (related) animals result from
divergent adaptation.Defining evolution
Following the paragraph above, how does one choose a
definition of evolution to use? Because science has no
catechisms, there is not a single, standard definition of
evolution. But some are more and less useful. A popular
one, especially among scientists who work on population
biology, is ‘a change in gene frequency in a population’.
This means, for example, that an allele with a frequency
of 0.75 in one generation can change to 0.73 in the next,
and this is evolution. Well, sort of. In the next gener-
ation, the frequency can change back to 0.75. So what
has evolved? It is like defining a football game as the
process of hiking the ball. This simple (or simplistic)
definition gets to one level of the processes of evolution
(yet it misses many processes from speciation to what
causes changes in gene frequencies in populations). Other
definitions, such as ‘the history of life’, get to the patternsof evolution, but do not describe their causes. So both
kinds of definitions are inadequate on their own.
Darwin’s definition, which he used in On the Origin of
Species, was ‘descent with modification’. Although it
may seem at first glance simplistic or vague, it embodies
both the patterns of evolution (descent) and its pro-
cesses (modification). It is as useful on a short timescale
as on a long one; it suggests minor evolutionary modifi-
cations as well as major ones. In the last paragraph of
Chapter 6 of the Origin, Darwin used this simple defin-
ition to settle a century of debate about what controls
the morphology of form in the first place (Figure 1).
Geoffroy St.-Hilaire and others had stressed ‘unity of
type’, the features that characterize major groups of ani-
mals (mollusks, arthropods, vertebrates) and separate
them from others. Baron Georges Cuvier had empha-
sized ‘conditions of existence’, circumstances that made
it advantageous for herbivorous animals to have crop-
ping teeth, complex guts, and hooves for fleet escape.
Darwin brushed away this conflict in a single paragraph
by showing that common descent could explain the com-
mon body plans of related organisms, and that natural
selection could explain their adaptive differences as they
were modified to fit the conditions of existence.
Avoid the term ‘modern’
About half the American populace has trouble of some
kind with understanding evolution. It only introduces
further confusion to use a word that has connotations of
progressivism. Progressivism is the idea that, through
history, things get better and better; or in this case, that
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makes evolution a march of progress through history up
to the superior forms of today (humans often, if tacitly,
being the apotheosis). The word ‘modern’ carries the
connotation of ‘improvement’ over what came before.
Whereas we accept that in the struggle for existence bet-
ter adapted forms should prevail over others, the eco-
logical landscape changes constantly as well, so a given
strategy is not foolproof for all ages. Just as ‘modern’ art
is not necessarily better than any other kind of art, ‘mod-
ern’ (that is, living) organisms are not either (Figure 2).
(Would a ‘modern’ cow be well-adapted for the Jurassic
Period?) Instead say ‘living’, ‘extant’, or ‘present-day’. The
term ‘modern’ adds a value judgment for many readers
that should not be there.
Avoid the words ‘primitive’ and ‘advanced’ (See ‘modern’)
These words also carry value judgments. Remember that
what we might call a ‘primitive’ characteristic of some
tetrapod wanna-bes from the Devonian was not only
perfectly useful to them at that point; it may have given
them a considerable advantage over what their fellow
wanna-bes had at the time. It does not make sense for
us to judge Devonian critters by the standards of what
organisms have evolved in the ensuing 350 million years.
Evolutionary biologists, when they examine changes in
characters through lineages of organisms (clades), do
this with reference to a phylogeny (Figure 3) based on a
great many evolutionary features, and on which the
characters of interest are mapped. The character state
that appears first in a lineage is usually called ‘basal’ in-
stead of ‘primitive’, and the various permutations of thatFigure 2 The problem with using the term ‘modern’ is that it implies
that organisms are fit for their present circumstances and not necessbasal character that appear later in the tree are called
‘derived’ instead of ‘advanced’. (This is explained, along
with the concept of the evogram, at http://evolution.
berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evograms_02.)
Think of it as you would human cultures. We no lon-
ger talk of some rituals and practices as ‘primitive’ and
others as ‘advanced’. It makes things clearer for readers
to avoid the same terms in biology.
‘Many scientists believe’ is a phrase with three
fundamental difficulties
This phraseology, and others like it (‘Some scientists
think’), is not as prevalent as it used to be in K-12 texts,
but its permutations persist. It poses a triple threat to sci-
ence education (Figure 4). First, ‘many’: science is not de-
cided by vote, so it does not matter how many scientists
accept an idea. It is about the quality of the evidence. Sec-
ond, ‘scientists’: in one sense, certainly, scientists are doing
this work, not milkmen or stockbrokers. And presumably
scientists are better trained than milkmen or stockbrokers
to analyze scientific evidence. Again, it is the quality of the
evidence. But even so, science is a very heterogeneous
business. A physicist is likely to have little expertise in the
complexity of paleontological problems, and this is recip-
rocally true for paleontologists and string theory.
Third, ‘believe’: saying that scientists ‘believe’ their re-
sults suggests, falsely, that their acceptance is not based
on evidence, but is based somehow on faith. Yet again, it
is about the quality of the evidence: scientists accept
their results as the best explanation of the problem that
we have at present, but we recognize that our findings
are subject to re-evaluation as new evidence comes tosuperior adaptability, whereas the evidence of evolution implies
arily all possible past and future ones.
Figure 3 Evogram of the transition of tetrapods from water to land in the Devonian, by Brian Swartz. The quotation at upper left is from
the creationist textbook Of Pandas and People (Davis et al. 1989). An evogram provides a variety of information, including a phylogeny based on
numerous characters, pictures and reconstructions of actual living and fossil specimens, and illustrations of homological transitions of features
such as limb bones and digit numbers. Note that the ‘fish-amphibian’ transition is given in quotation marks: true fishes (rayfins like the trout) did
not evolve into amphibians (frogs and salamanders and their relatives). Rather, this evogram depicts the evolution of the first tetrapods from
basal sarcopterygians in the Devonian.
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often use the word ‘believe’ when discussing their re-
sults! It is just sloppy diction: they would not say that
their conclusions are a matter of faith, rather than of
evidence.
Instead of saying ‘many scientists believe’ or ‘some scien-
tists think’, it is more productive to talk about the evidence.
What evidence (if any) supports a certain hypothesis, and
what evidence (if any) seems to contradict it? And two
more things: first, discuss what else we would have to
know before we can advance the question further; and sec-
ond, be clear about how we would know if a hypothesis
were wrong. This, more than anything else, shows students
what the process of science is all about. It takes a little
more work on the part of the writer, but it is worth it in
raising student interest and understanding. (An indispens-
able reference for explaining how science actually works is
at http://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/howscienceworks_01.)Figure 4 The phrase ‘Many scientists believe …’, long a staple
of textbook writers, is seriously misleading for at least three
reasons and should be expunged from science writing.For example, many texts and the vast majority of news
reporters like to repeat the idea that an asteroid crashed
into the Earth some 65 million years ago and destroyed
the dinosaurs and a lot of other organisms. This is a com-
plex idea, and parts of it could be wrong or right without
destroying the general concept that a large asteroid im-
pact could have created substantial environmental havoc.
Scientists from many disciplines have worked on this
problem for decades. No one has all pieces of the puzzle,
and their individual trainings influence what they think is
important and even what they understand. But none of
this is a question of belief or faith.
It is accurate to say that many people accept or think
that an asteroid killed the dinosaurs, and this includes a
lot of scientists. But most scientists who actually work
on the dinosaurs of that time period do not agree that
an asteroid killed them. That by itself should be import-
ant, but it is not as important as the evidence: when
various lineages of vertebrates are traced across the
Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary, it turns out that some
mammal lineages were affected and some were not,
most vertebrates such as crocodiles, lizards, and am-
phibians were not severely affected, and that all but
three kinds of dinosaur had disappeared during the pre-
ceding six million years - presumably not in anticipation
of the great crash. So the evidence is what scientists rely
on - or should. And this is true for those who report on
the issues.
Do not personalize a scientific debate
A scientific controversy is usually not mainly about the
people involved (unless they make it personal), but about
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conclusion or conflict. To punch up the history of evo-
lution, textbook writers often contrast the views of
Lamarck and Darwin on how the giraffe got such a long
neck. They do not say that Lamarck wrote 50 years be-
fore Darwin, that they never met or corresponded, or
that neither man devoted more than a paragraph to the
subject among the thousands of pages that each pub-
lished (Figure 5). Lamarck’s views were complex and
would be strange to us today, because like many early
Enlightenment savants he devised a grand ‘system’ that
purported to explain everything from the motion of
rivers and oceans to blood circulation (see Gould’s Struc-
ture of Evolutionary Theory). Lamarck’s ideas were ob-
scure even in his own day, and it is questionable to
devote space to them in current textbooks.
Often, however, the personal aspect intervenes as sci-
entists in a certain field will tend to favor one hypo-
thesis over another, simply because they have been
educated to understand (and therefore trust) some lines
of evidence over others. The story is still usually not
about individual scientists, but about standards of evi-
dence in different fields.
For example, until about a decade ago paleontologists
and molecular biologists differed on the subject of the
closest relatives of whales. Geneticists had found some
very unusual and diagnostic molecular sequences called
SINEs in both whales and hippopotamus (Shedlock et al.
2000). They inferred that these animals were each other’s
closest relatives, and that made sense, some molecular
biologists said, because both groups are large, aquatic,
and hairless. Paleontologists dismissed this because the
earliest known whales were first found in the early Eo-
cene, some 50 million years ago; whereas the first hipposFigure 5 Hypotheses for the evolution of the giraffe neck fascinated
despite impressions given in some K-12 textbooks, Lamarck and Darwin ne
cartoon by Gary Larson that would be prohibitively expensive to reproduceare not known until about 15 million years ago. Where
could you hide the missing hippos for 35 million years?
Moreover, the first known hippos were not large,
aquatic, and hairless, but small, terrestrial, and probably
not hairless.
The reconciliation came with the paleontological dis-
covery that hippos seem to have evolved from a more
basal group of mammals called anthracotheres, which
are found as far back as the Eocene, and could be closely
related to whales (Figure 6; Thewissen et al. 2009).
These anthracotheres were not aquatic or especially
large, and they did not resemble whales at all. But they
did share a common ancestor with whales. It was not
that the paleontologists suddenly accepted the evidence
of the molecular biologists, who had made naïve state-
ments about the presumed common ancestral features
and habits of whales and hippos. It was more that pale-
ontologists found evidence from their own field that
made sense to them, and allowed a re-evaluation of the
question. Now we have agreement on both sides.
This is not a perfect system, but it is how science often
works. Note that this example was not about individual
scientists arguing with each other, but about the kinds of
evidence that scientists in certain fields are trained to
understand and preferentially accept. (For more infor-
mation, visit http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/
article/evograms_03 and cited references.)
Students and other audiences will benefit more from
having the evidence explained to them than from asking
them to choose sides based on profiles of opposing scien-
tists. (Textbooks often ask students to make judgments
about the social implications of scientific questions such
as climate change after receiving only minimal informa-
tion.) In so doing, they will experience more accuratelyearly writers on evolution and continue to do so today. However,
ver had an argument about it. This figure honors a classic ‘Far Side’
here.
Figure 6 A phylogeny of artiodactyls, based on various current
sources. Whales and hippos are each other’s closest living relatives,
but they diverged more than 50 million years ago, and the earliest
members of their lineages looked very different than their
living representatives.
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and arguments that fit the evidence together and provide
more or less inclusive explanations of that evidence (see
http://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/howscienceworks_01).
And, whereas it does little service to profile scientists who
are on different sides of an issue, and personalize and
polarize their arguments for students to choose between,
it is perfectly useful to profile individual scientists who
have pioneered concepts in a field, as well as including
other people who have worked with them, to show how
science is a cooperative enterprise. After all, most present-
day scientific problems are advanced not by lone individ-
uals but by teams of people from many institutions who
take years to propose hypotheses, make research plans,
and carry out interdisciplinary research.
Historical and philosophical aspects of evolution
‘Evolution’ has meant different things at different periods
of history
Darwin used the root word only once in the Origin of
Species (the last word of the book is ‘evolved’), because
in his day ‘evolution’ denoted the gradual, predetermined
unfolding of organismal development (a fiddlehead fern,
for example, or the shell of a snail). He wanted to avoid
the ‘predetermined’ aspect, and this is why he preferred
the term ‘transmutation’ when discussing changes in
species through time. But, after the publication of his
book, ‘evolution’ increasingly came to mean what it does
today. (See Bowler 2009 for good background on this
and related topics.)
It was possible in pre-Darwinian times to accept some
or most lines of evidence for what we would now en-
compass as ‘evolution’. For example, the sequence of
fossilized life through time in the geologic record wasestablished by the earliest stratigraphers, such as William
Smith, the civil engineer who published his geological
map of England in 1801. Smith was no ‘evolutionist’ in
our sense of the word. But he saw that fossils and rocks
succeeded each other through the rock column, what
was called the progression of life through time. (Of
course, in those days no one really knew how much
time was involved.) This was pretty much undeniable
for any scientist by the 1820s.
However, the progression of life through time could be
explained in various ways. A creditable view in the 18th
and early 19th centuries was that there could have been
a series of events of creation, following large-scale global
or regional extinctions. But where in Scripture was this
view validated? Besides, long before the 19th century,
natural philosophers had stopped looking to Scripture
for answers about science. Alternatively, it could be pro-
posed that species were transformed into other species
through succeeding geological strata. But what would
have been the mechanism of this change? That mechan-
ism, in the end, was what Darwin hoped to provide in
the Origin of Species in the form of natural selection.
But he had to overcome a lot of skepticism that such an
explanation was even possible. Moreover, he was provid-
ing a strictly material explanation of this transformation.
In this he was departing from many of his contempo-
raries, including Richard Owen and Charles Lyell, who
were uncomfortable with an explanation of evolutionary
change that did not include some role of a Higher Power,
however mechanistic (Bowler 2009).
In the Victorian Era, one could accept evolution (the
‘unfolding’ of organisms through time, like the pre-
determined ‘unfolding’ of a leaf or fiddlehead fern) but not
transmutation (a direct change of one kind of organism
into another). This seems strange to us today, but if we
want to understand Victorian and pre-Victorian sensibil-
ities to scientific explanation, we have to wrap our heads
around it. (See the description of Richard Owen’s views
below.)
‘Gradual’ did not always mean gradual
The avatars of the Modern Synthesis of Evolution saw
evolution as ‘gradual’ in Darwin’s terms, which they
read as a series of slow and insensibly small changes.
Darwin was more pluralistic. In his diary he described
the huge earthquake at Concepcion, Chile, the effects
of which he witnessed from the Beagle, suddenly
uplifting the sea cliffs by meters, as a ‘gradual’ change.
This makes no sense to us until we realize that the root
of ‘gradual’ is in the Latin gradus or ‘step’, so ‘gradual’
implies a step-like change. For Darwin the steps were
small, but they were not insensibly so (Padian 2008a,
2009). It is tempting to suggest that Darwin would have
seen little difference between the evolutionary tempos
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ria’ (Figure 7).
It is very important to explain to students that small
steps (as in punctuated equilibria) and insensible changes
(as in classical gradualism) are more like each other than
are small steps and very large steps. The latter mechanism -
sudden, great morphological changes - has never been
seriously considered in evolutionary theory, and the no-
tion that ‘large steps’ create macroevolutionary changes
(for example, that a bird could have hatched from a lizard
egg) is a caricature. There should not be a need to men-
tion Richard Goldschmidt’s (1940) much-maligned, scien-
tifically naïve ‘hopeful monster’, because hardly anyone has
ever considered it seriously as a mechanism of major evo-
lutionary change, or has uncovered any evidence for it.
That said, Goldschmidt’s book is a brilliant survey of eco-
phenotypic variation by a first-rate laboratory geneticist
and field biologist, and it should be read closely rather
than dismissed.
Use care in characterizing the religious beliefs of
historical figures
Like most men of the Enlightenment (including most of
American’s founding fathers), Darwin (for much of his life)
was a Deist: he thought there was something bigger than
human consciousness, but he did not personify it (as
theists do), and gradually he lost all feeling that we would
call religious (as opposed to spiritual: Desmond and Moore
1992, Moore 1994). His colleague Thomas Henry Huxley
coined the word ‘agnostic’, and Darwin grew more com-
fortable with that term as he grew older (Padian 2009).
Darwin’s views on religion changed through life, from
fairly conventional beliefs through doubt in Providence to
the absence of all interest in the subject.Figure 7 Because Darwin used the term ‘gradual’ to mean
small steps in a much larger progression over time, as in the
sudden elevation of the Chilean coast following an earthquake,
he probably would regard the dichotomy between ‘punctuated
equilibria’ and classic Neo-Darwinian gradualism as mainly a
question of scale.Other historical figures, respected scientists who rejected
Darwin’s views, or the ideas of evolution advanced in their
times, were not necessarily creationists, and not usually in
the strict sense of biblical literalism that we understand it
today. Cuvier, for example, was not a biblical creationist,
as he is often portrayed. He was a Lutheran by birth, but
he seemed to have little interest in religion, and it did not
enter his scientific work. He was not a catastrophist in the
conventional sense of the term, either. His studies of
abrupt transitions in the rock types and fossils of the hills
around the Paris Basin were observational: he reported
what he saw. He knew that these transitions reflected
regional environmental events, but one reason why he
maintained his respected status for so long in a turbulent
France was that he avoided making rash pronouncements.
Cuvier did not think that these transitions were the result
of divinely mandated catastrophes; and although he did
not fully understand the mechanisms behind them, he hy-
pothesized that the animals that succeeded those of earlier
strata may have migrated in from elsewhere as the envi-
ronments changed. He was not positing the transform-
ation of species, but neither was he suggesting a series
of divine creations of each new fauna (Rudwick 1997;
Taquet 2006).
In the same way, it would be wrong to call Richard
Owen, Darwin’s greatest nemesis, a creationist, or even
an anti-evolutionist. Owen was likely a deist, though he
assuaged the theistic views of much of his Victorian
audience. He knew the fossil record well and accepted
the progression of life through time. He even thought
that species could arise continually through a common
ancestral form, modified somehow by development and
the influence of the environment; but he was shadowy
on these points (Padian 1997, 2007).Avoid pitting science against religion, even though
sometimes there are real conflicts
There has always been some kind of religious opposition
to any and all ideas about evolution (and other scientific
concepts). Nevertheless, there has been no serious scien-
tific opposition to evolution since the Victorian Era. Yes,
scientists do disagree and debate about various evolu-
tionary mechanisms and patterns, and their relative im-
portance, although they do not dispute that all living
things have evolved from common ancestors. But just
because all is not solved does not mean that evolution-
ary biology is in a state of turmoil. We like to say that
‘science is open-minded, not empty-headed’: trying to
advance solutions to problems, based on what we
already have found and want to know next, is why scien-
tists get up in the morning. Scientific propositions are
supposed to be testable, and ‘Science’ does not equal
‘Truth’, a word that should not be used in science.
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tracts scorn from religious fundamentalists, who build
their lives on what they accept as immutable truths of
faith. The principal act of faith of a scientist is accepting
that the natural world is knowable, and that we can use
our (however imperfect) faculties and judgment to learn
about natural phenomena and trust our results, wherever
our investigations lead. After that, the rules of scientific
inquiry are not about faith, but about posing and testing
hypotheses. But science has its limits, and the supernatural
is one of them. In short, science does not deal with the
supernatural. Religion has its limits too, and one of them
is in making statements about the natural world. There is
only conflict between science and religion if people want
it; or rather, there is conflict when people want it. That
conflict comes from either side saying more than it rea-
sonably can about its domain. But the non-theistic axiom
of science (see below) means that it does not favor or dis-
favor any particular religious or other supernatural beliefs.
In return, its statements about the natural world should
not be contradicted on the basis of any sectarian religious
beliefs. So, regardless of what some interpretations of old
writings about Scripture-professed, scientific evidence af-
firms that the Earth cannot be 6,000 years old. That is in
direct conflict with some religious views. Contemporary
evolutionary biologists hold varying religious views; con-
trast, for example, Gould (2002a), Miller (2007), Coyne
(2009), and Asher (2012). But when they operate as scien-
tists, they do not place religious views above empirical
evidence.
In textbooks, it is appropriate to discuss why evolution
or any scientific idea or hypothesis was or is controver-
sial as science (cold fusion is an example). But it is not
appropriate to pretend that well-established scientific
concepts are controversial. It is also not appropriate to
note that some scientific concepts were controversial in
the past, without noting the present state of understand-
ing of those concepts (a great many important scientific
ideas are controversial when they are first proposed).
Cultural and religious controversy about science has no
place in science texts, and pedagogical activities that
encourage children to have debates about evolution or
global warming - in an educational system where they
can have only the most rudimentary exposure to these
subjects - merely amplify the prejudices of the students’
families.
Is there room to discuss cultural and social controver-
sies over scientific ideas in textbooks? Perhaps, although
the focus of a science textbook should be squarely on
the science. But textbook authors who choose to discuss
cultural and social controversies should be careful to en-
sure that they are not misrepresenting the science as
controversial or offensive to the beliefs of their readers,
and thus undercutting the legitimacy of the science.Avoid giving the impression that evolution is atheistic, or
that evolutionists must be atheists
All science is non-theistic, by which is meant that it does
not entail or require any concept of a god or other super-
natural being or force. In fact, science is completely inde-
pendent of any ideas about gods or other supernatural
beliefs. But science is not anti-theistic: it does not deny
such beings or forces, any more than it accepts them (or
leprechauns or unicorns), because these things are not
within the purview of science. There are many meanings
of ‘atheism’ (literally, ‘without god’). We too often lump to-
gether various permutations of non-belief, and in so doing
we allow religious fundamentalists (anti-anti-theists, so to
speak) to treat scientists and others, who simply operate
without reference to any particular deity, as if they were
anti-religion (Figure 8; Onfray 2011).
Individual scientists, like accountants, plumbers, and
postal employees, can be atheistic or deeply religious in
any number of ways. But science places no strictures on
their beliefs except to ask them to be checked at the
door when it is time to test the hypotheses. This has
been the case since the Enlightenment coalesced.
Furthermore, the scientific study of nature, or natural-
ism, has two main approaches, but only one is scientific;
the other is philosophical. Philosophical naturalism says
that observable nature is all there is; methodological
naturalism says that there may or may not be more than
the observable phenomena of nature, but science is only
concerned with what can be observed.
Natural selection and related concepts
Do not personify natural selection
Natural selection is not an entity like Cher, Lady Gaga,
or the Statue of Liberty, and it is not a force like wind. It
is more correctly characterized as a description of a
mechanism of differential survival of individuals in a
lineage, rather than the cause itself. In his later years,
Darwin regretted using the term in a causal sense, rather
than sticking with the more forthright ‘struggle for exist-
ence’. Natural selection, personified as a force that acts
on organisms, becomes little more than a rhetorical
equivalent of a Deity when placed in sentences such as
‘Natural selection would favor the acquisition of such-
and-such a feature’. Substitute ‘God’ or ‘elves’ for ‘nat-
ural selection’ and the emptiness of this rhetoric be-
comes clear, even though, with evidence, the statement
about what was favored could be supported (Figure 9).
The problem is in writing as if you were ascribing the
‘favoring’ of a trait to an actual, personified third party,
rather than explaining the circumstances by which it
was favored. Language like this is really not much differ-
ent than that used by the advocates of ‘Intelligent De-
sign’. Yet Darwin used it many times himself in The
Origin of Species.
Figure 8 A taxonomy of religious belief and non-belief. Believers include various kinds of theists (those who personify their gods) and deists
(who do not). Non-believers include agnostics (who think it is impossible to decide whether a god exists), what I call ‘allo-theists’ (who believe in
gods, only not the ones that others think you should believe in, such as Christians who regard Muslims as infidels and vice versa), non-theists
(who unlike agnostics do not think the question of the existence of God is relevant to them), and anti-theists (who are convinced there is no god
or gods, and are opposed to religions in general).
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was to explain that the traits in any given lineage at any
given time showed considerable variation. Some of these
variations worked better than others at the time, for
whatever circumstantial reasons. Their bearers were more
likely to survive to leave offspring with these same vari-
ations. In the struggle for existence, they were better
able to persist. We would call that entire process natural
selection. This is more accurate than saying ‘natural se-
lection favored this particular trait’.Figure 9 The problem with personifying natural selection is
that it always seems to come to have an identity of its own. In
this way it is little different from the narrative actions committed by
gods or even leprechauns.An extension of this kind of personification is when an
author says, ‘Natural selection would have favored the
acquisition of such-and such a trait’. Nobody knows in
advance what ‘natural selection would favor’, because vir-
tually everything we know about the effects of natural se-
lection is in hindsight. This phraseology suggests a naïve
faith in the optimality of evolutionary processes, and some
omniscience on the part of the author, in continuing to
personify natural selection as if it were a conscious being.
Of course, scientists do not really think these things (do
we?); we just write as if we do. Natural selection is a de-
scription of a process, not an actor; we recognize it as a
post hoc outcome of the struggle for existence.
Natural selection is not ‘creative’
Remembering the previous point, it is more accurate to
say that in the struggle for existence, some individuals
are weeded out before they can reproduce. This process
is not creative, any more than a lawnmower is creative
with your backyard grass. Recombination of features
through sexual reproduction might - might - be analo-
gized as ‘creative’, except that the recombination is en-
tirely random. (In contrast, the pigment splashes on a
Jackson Pollock painting only look random; they are ac-
tually highly creative.) And really: why push it? The term
is anthropomorphic. Leave creativity to the artists.
Avoid ‘evolved for’
Teachers knowledgeable about evolution have a very
hard time with this expression. It is almost obvious as
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‘evolve for’ some function. But this sloppy diction gives
the uninitiated the impression that there is a direction to
evolution that is manifestly teleological. Yes, there are
evolutionary trends of many kinds; but organisms do not
want to get to one point on an evolutionary continuum
and look backward with the idea that life has been a long
struggle to get to that point, as if consciously.
For example, feathers did not evolve ‘for’ flight. They
were already performing several functions for the dino-
saurs that had them before one lineage happened to use
them aerodynamically. Among the earlier functions were
insulation, color patterns (display or camouflage or spe-
cies recognition), and even brooding on nests (Padian
2008c). The evolution of features in a group of organ-
isms can be like the man who got up on his horse and
rode off in all directions. There was not a goal in sight,
so it is better to avoid language that suggests it.
Evolution is not universally a question of ‘pressure’
There is no doubt that individuals in nature face enor-
mous selective pressure throughout their lives - the re-
sult of competition, predation, insufficient resources,
and environmental stress. However, when we think
about new adaptations that seem to have contributed so
much to the success of varied groups of organisms, we
get a different picture. Most of the critical ‘inventions’ in
evolutionary history do not seem to have happened be-
cause there was intense pressure for something like that
to happen. At least, we cannot find much evidence for
this, except perhaps in cases such as the evolution of
dense fur by mammals as ice ages encroached. (We pre-
sume that natural variations in the length and thickness
of fur were favored in the struggle for existence.) Rather,
these ‘inventions’ evolved because organisms found an
opportunity to exploit a new way of doing things. For
example, we do not think that birds evolved flight be-
cause they were forced to do so. However flight evolved,
it was an opportunity to turn the structure and functions
of forelimbs and feathers to new purposes.
One way to explain this is through economics. Given
that analogies are only teaching tools; they do not repre-
sent a real material connection. Nevertheless, students
understand it when you explain that microwave technol-
ogy was developed during World War II as a way to try
to detect aircraft activity; and now we have ovens that
use this technology in virtually every home and office.
There was not an economic ‘pressure’ to develop micro-
wave ovens; it was an opportunity that manifested itself,
based on an incentive to solve a completely different
problem. In evolution we call this exaptation, and it is
one of the most important concepts in the field, even
though it was only identified in 1982 by Stephen Jay
Gould and Elisabeth Vrba.‘Fitness’ is not about how many offspring you leave
Darwin (1859) used the word ‘fitness’ to describe how
well-suited an organism is for its environment. If a horse
were more fit, it could better outrun its predators (or at
least outrun the horse next to it, who became someone’s
breakfast). On the face of it, this concept does not seem
to be related to leaving offspring, so let us see how the
concept of ‘fitness’ became for so many evolutionary bi-
ologists ‘how many offspring you leave’.
In the early days of the Modern Synthesis of Evolu-
tion, nearly 1 century ago, mathematical biologists were
struggling with ways to quantify the ability of some indi-
viduals to survive better than others. Darwin called this
‘fitness’. But how were these modelers to quantify an
adaptive advantage? The advantage needed to be heredi-
tary, but there were no obvious genes for ‘adaptive ad-
vantage’, even though coefficients of selection for given
alleles were used even in the earliest literature of the
Modern Synthesis (Provine 2001).
Consider the larger picture. Those individuals that
were better adapted, Darwin and Wallace said, would be
more likely to survive and reproduce, passing their traits
to the next generation. The mathematicians took a
shortcut, redefining ‘fitness’ to represent the number of
offspring that an individual left. That became the ‘mean
fitness’ or ‘w’ of a population.
But here is the problem. What is important is not that
individuals who are better adapted will leave more off-
spring. (They do not always.) It is that they are more
likely to survive to reproductive age and leave offspring.
What’s more, their offspring will be better adapted to
environmental conditions than other offspring. What is
the difference between these ideas? Plenty. Consider that
in any population there could be genes for higher and
lower fecundity (the production of offspring). In other
words, how many offspring you produce is independent
of how well adapted they will be to their surroundings.
The corruption of the Darwinian term ‘fitness’ can be
shown mathematically. Consider two lineages, A and B.
B has 1.2 times the fecundity of A, but in hard times B
has only 0.60 the survivability of A, which is a better
competitor. In times of relaxed selection, B will out-
reproduce A by 20% per generation. But if selection
pressure is strong, that increased fecundity will be di-
minished by a 60% survival rate, so compared to lineage
A, lineage B will have a survival rate of 1.2 × 0.6, or
72% of that of lineage A. It is not about the number of
offspring you produce; it’s about their survivability
(Figure 10).
This would have been obvious to Darwin and Wallace,
who were (like all other literate people of their time)
well steeped in Malthus’s (1803, among many editions)
Essay on Population. The poor, Malthus wrote, are prof-
ligate with their offspring, irrespective of their means of
Figure 10 Why fecundity (the Neo-Darwinian index of ‘fitness’)
alone does not assure better representation in the next
generation. It depends on survivability, that is to say, adaptive
‘fitness’, which is what Darwin was talking about. The underlined
numbers convey the differential in success under hard and soft
selection. See text for explanation.
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more successful.
By this reasoning, the number of offspring you leave
cannot be regarded as a proxy for your adaptive ‘fitness’,
because those offspring could be competitively inferior. If
the ‘struggle for existence’ is particularly difficult, few of
them (if any) will survive, so fecundity alone is not a
virtue. (In fact, it could be a disadvantage if many offspring
have to compete for the same limited resources.) When
Darwin speaks in the Origin about leaving more offspring,
he is presuming that these offspring carry inherited traits
that are better adapted for the environment; and the rea-
son their parents are leaving more offspring is that more
of them are surviving to reproductive age than the individ-
uals who were less well adapted.
What, then, is fitness? The population biologists appro-
priated the term long ago, so we are stuck with regarding
it as related to reproductive success (essentially, fecundity)
rather than individual adaptiveness, as Darwin used it -
unless it is implicit that the success carries with it better
genes, not simply more offspring. It is therefore a question
of the quality of the offspring, a reflection of their inhe-
rited characteristics. Individuals with features better adap-
ted to their surroundings will pass on those features to
their offspring, who are likely to be better adapted than
others who lack them. But the reason that they have better
adapted offspring is that they have passed on more advan-
tageous features to the next generation.
Now we can see our way through a classic evolution-
ary paradox, notably pointed out by the evolutionary
geneticist C.H. Waddington (1967). In the diction of the
Modern Synthesis, he noted, ‘survival of the fittest’ be-
comes a tautology. The ones who leave the most off-
spring are the most fit; and how do we know they are
the most fit? Because they leave the most offspring. Cre-
ationists seized on this circular reasoning to embarrassevolutionists, and the definition of the Modern Synthesis
provided no way out of it.
But there is a way out. The missing logical step, as
Waddington said, is the one that the population modelers
omitted (see above): the most fit (that is, prolific) individ-
uals - those who leave the most offspring in the next gen-
eration - are assumed to be the ones whose traits are best
adapted to their environments. That is a testable hypoth-
esis. We can test whether the traits that we think are most
advantageous were really preferentially inherited by the
next generation. If not, the hypothesis of natural selection
is not sustained in a particular case. Without testing
whether presumably better adapted individuals are the
ones with greater reproductive success, natural selection is
an assumption rather than a scientific hypothesis.
Sexual selection is not a kind of natural selection
Darwin faced a problem when he was writing his great
treatment on natural selection that eventually was dis-
tilled to On the Origin of Species. He could explain, he
thought, why features that improved the ability of an or-
ganism to survive and carry out its functions would be
favored and passed along in future generations. But he
knew it would be harder to explain why some features
(such as the famous peacock’s tail) persisted and were
often strongly conspicuous, even though they seemed to
have no purpose in helping an organism to survive. He
observed that in nearly all cases, these features were use-
ful in the struggle for mates, rather than in the struggle
for existence. And for this reason he separated this
phenomenon, which he called sexual selection, from the
process of natural selection.
Although some authors state that sexual selection is ‘a
kind of ’ natural selection, this view is incorrect (Padian
and Horner 2011a, 2011b). Darwin not only explicitly
separated the two concepts; he acknowledged that they
were quite often in conflict (what if the peacock’s long
tail makes it easier for a predator to catch it?). He even
wrote a book about it: The Descent of Man, or Selection
in Relation to Sex (1871). He clearly felt that sexual se-
lection was as important in the evolution of humans as
natural selection was. And, although he acknowledged
that the roles of some morphological structures of ani-
mals are difficult to determine, he was adamant about
how to recognize when they had a role in sexual selec-
tion (Figure 11). This brings us to the next point.
Sexual selection requires sexual dimorphism
Despite extensive confusion in the recent literature, Darwin
was clear about what sexual selection is, and what the role
of sexual dimorphism (conspicuous differences between
males and females) is in it (Padian and Horner 2011a,
2011b). He stated in the plainest language in the Origin of
Species (pp. 79–80):
Figure 11 Darwin regarded sexual selection, a concept he originated and defined precisely, as something very different than natural
selection. In this hierarchy of terms related to social recognition in lineages, it can be seen that sexual selection is only a small and very
specialized syndrome within a larger context of choosing and competing for mates.
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of any animal have the same general habits of life, but
differ in structure, colour, or ornament, such differences
have been mainly caused by sexual selection; that is, in-
dividual males have had, in successive generations, someFigure 12 Darwin stressed that sexual dimorphism was the linchpin o
explain the evolution of bizarre features in one sex - because they wslight advantage over other males, in their weapons,
means of defence, or charms; and have transmitted these
advantages to their male offspring’.
Because Darwin invented sexual selection, and because
he based it on observations that have never been falsified,f sexual selection; indeed, this was the only way he could
ere used either to attract mates or repel rivals.
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(1) it explains why sexual dimorphism exists, and its central
role in sexual selection; (2) the dimorphic structures or be-
haviors are used by one gender to attract mates or repel ri-
vals for mates; and (3) these structures and behaviors help
the bearer gain access to mates (not necessarily leave more
offspring, but to leave offspring more competitive in mat-
ing; Figure 12). Darwin needed to define this concept as he
did because he knew that opponents would complain that
natural selection (which was a description of how the adap-
tive, Darwinian ‘fitness’ of individuals should increase
through generations) could not account for bizarre struc-
tures that were used to enhance mating success, but could
be a liability to one’s survival, as we have seen in the previ-
ous point. Sexual selection was invented precisely to ex-
plain unusual dimorphic structures used in mating, and
therefore dimorphism is essential to it.
Again, as with natural selection, sexual selection is not
simply a matter of producing more offspring. It is about
leaving more offspring in the next generation who have
the features that are desired by potential mates, or com-
petitive in attracting them. This advantage should even-
tually allow the numbers game to take care of itself in
future generations; it is not simply a matter of fecundity.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to identify and explore
some persistent misconceptions in evolutionary biology
that are broadly found not only in textbooks and popular
science publications, but in scientific journals and books. I
have no illusion that other scientists will be in unanimous
agreement with all the points I raise here. I challenge all of
us, however, to consider the points and improve upon
them, so that in turn we can help journalists, textbook
writers, and others to interpret our science for the public.
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